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Torfs-Parent"-Child Immunify-Third-Party
Torffeasors*
The rule that there can be no actions between a parent and his
unemancipated child for negligent torts in their ordinary family re-
lationship had been approved by every state supreme court that had
heard such an action prior to 1963.1 The rule at the same time had
been "universally condemned in [virtually all] the thoughtful pro-
fessional and student writings on the subject."'2
The New Mexico Supreme Court adopted the parent-child im-
munity doctrine in the 1966 case of Nahas v. Noble." This was an
action arising from an accident in which the plaintiff-mother was in-
jured while riding in a car driven by her nineteen year old defendant-
daughter. The trial court directed a verdict in favor of the defend-
ant. On appeal the plaintiff asserted as error the trial court's appli-
cation of the parent-child immunity doctrine. The New Mexico
Supreme Court, held, Affirmed, on the grounds that such actions
provoked "antagonism," were inconsistent with the "parent's posi-
tion" and were "repugnant". 4 The court said the "long-established
and generally accepted [parent-child immunity] rule is a matter for
proper consideration by the legislature but . . . should not be
overturned by the court."' Justice Moise dissented on the ground
that "logic and reason do not support such an immunity."6
The Wisconsin Supreme Court, in the 1963 case of Goller v.
White,7 was the first to abolish the parent-child immunity rule. Only
cases involving exercises of parental control and authority or par-
ental discretion with respect to food and care were excepted. Since
the Goller case, two other jurisdictions have moved to abrogate
the doctrine: New Hampshire in Gaudreau v. Gaudreau' and Min-
nesota in Balts v. Balts.9
* Nahas v. Noble, 77 N.M. 139, 420 P.2d 127 (1966).
1. W. Prosser, Law of Torts § 116, at 887 (3d ed. 1964).
2. See the dissenting opinion in Hastings v. Hastings, 33 N.J. 247, 163 A.2d 147,
151 (1960) for an exhaustive list of writings on the subject. Included are F. Harper &
F. James, The Law of Torts §§ 8.11, 13.4 (1956) ; W. Prosser, Law of Torts § 101 (2d
ed. 1955); McCurdy, Torts betwtaeen Persons in Domestic Relation, 43 Harv. L. Rev.
1030 (1930) ;Seavy, Torts, 1958 Annual Survey of American Law, p. 487.
3. 77 N.M. 139, 420 P.2d 127 (1966).
4. Id. at 140, 420 P.2d at 128.
5. Id. at 142, 420 P.2d at 129.
6. Id. at 143, 420 P.2d at 129.
7. 20 Wis. 2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963).
8. 106 N.H. 551, 215 A.2d 695 (1965).
9. 273 Minn. 419, 142 N.W.2d 66 (1966).
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The parent-child immunity rule was not developed at early Eng-
lish common law. The medieval conception of the legal identity of
husband and wife prevented litigation between the two,'0 but this
theory was never extended to the parent-child relationship. The
English courts readily recognized causes of action between parent
and child in matters of property, but they were noticeably silent on
actions for personal injury."
The parent-child immunity rule was first established in the 1891
Mississippi case of Hewlett v. George, 2 where a minor daughter
brought suit against her mother for a wrongful confinement in an
insane asylum. The court cited no authority, but said:
The peace of society, and of the families composing society, and
a sound public policy, designed to subserve the repose of families
and the best interests of society, forbid to the minor child a right to
appear in court in the assertion of a claim to civil redress for personal
injuries suffered at the hands of the parent.' 3
Early cases following Hewlett applied the rule broadly. 4 Later,
however, exceptions were etched into the rule. Justice Moise listed
them in his dissenting opinion in Nahas v. Noble:
These exceptions include father and son in master-servant rela-
tionship, child riding in father's school bus, infant riding with par-
ent who is a common carrier, parent as a member of a partnership,
parent's wilful misconduct . . . , peace of the home already dis-
turbed beyond repair, recovery from father's employer though the
father (employer's servant) was immune, recovery after emancipa-
tion, recovery after majority, recovery against one who stands in
place of a parent, recovery by brother against sister, child's adminis-
trator recovering from parent, and . . . the reverse--child recover-
ing from representative of the deceased parent, . . . and parent's
dealings with infant's property (wills, partnerships, real estate,
etc.) .15
10. W. Prosser, sutra note 1 at 879. Two thirds of the jurisdictions still adhere to
the common law doctrine of interspousal immunity despite the passage of the Married
Women's Acts in virtually every state. Id. at 883-84.
11. Id. at 886.
12. 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885, 13 L.R.A. 682 (1891).
13. Id. 9 So. at 887, 13 L.R.A. at 684.
14. No recovery allowed for injuries from (1) a brutal beating-McKelvey v.
McKelvey, 111 Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664 (1903) ; (2) a rape-Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash.
242, 79 P. 788 (1905).
15. 77 N.M. 139, 144, 420 P.2d 127, 130 (1966).
JULY 1968]
NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL
Dunlap v. Dunlap,"6 a 1930 New Hampshire case, was the first
to challenge the rationality of the entire parent-child immunity rule:
On its face, the rule is a harsh one. It denies protection to the
weak upon the ground that in this relation the administration of jus-
tice has been committed to the strong and that authority must be
maintained. 17
The challenge was dictum, however, since the court held that the
master-servant relationship of the parent and child took the case
out of the rule.
Two dissenting opinions have caused courts to take a second look
at the rule. Justice Fuld, dissenting in the New York case of Badigan
v. Badigan,'8 attacked the rule as being "based on dubious prophecy
. . .wrong in principle and at odds with justice and modern day
realities."' 9 In the New Jersey case of Hastings v. Hastings,2 ° Jus-
tice Jacobs called for the extension of liability insurance coverage to
the wife and child.'
Today, the main reasons given for the parent-child immunity
rule are (1) preservation of domestic tranquility and parental con-
trol, and (2) avoidance of fraud and collusion. 2
The Minnesota Supreme Court in Baits v. Balts23 disputed the
soundness of both reasons:
The argument that litigation by a parent against a child promotes
discord is difficult to follow. Where a wrong has been committed of
a character sufficiently aggravated to justify recovery were the parties
strangers, the harm has been done. We believe the prospect of recon-
ciliation is enhanced as much by equitable reparation as by denying
relief altogether, particularly where the defendant is insured.2 4
16. 84 N.H. 352,150 A. 905, 71 A.L.R. 1055 (1930).
17. Id. 150 A. at 909, 71 A.L.R. at 1063.
18. 9 N.Y.2d 472, 174 N.E.2d 718 (1961).
19. Id. 174 N.E.2d at 720.
20. 33 N.J. 247, 163 A.2d 147 (1960).
21. Id. 163 A.2d at 151.
22. Other reasons advanced by early decisions were (1) danger of fraud in the
prosecution of stale claims; (2) possibility of succession by the parent; (3) depletion
of the "family exchequer"; and (4) analogy to the situation of husband and wife.
These reasons were dismissed by Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 A. 905, 909, 71
A.L.R. 1055, 1063 (1930), as being "too unsubstantial to be considered as more than
mere make-weights."
23. 273 Minn. 419, 142 N.W.2d 66 (1966).
24. Id. 142 N.W.2d at 73.
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The court said further that:
[In] the experience of states where interspousal immunity has
been abolished . .. [n]othing has come to our attention which in-
dicates that these jurisdictions are deluged with collusive actions or
that such litigation is ridden with fraud. .... We conclude, there-
fore, that the judicial system is adequate to accommodate itself to
threats of collusion and that the injustice of continued immunity
outweighs the danger of fraud.25
The effect of liability insurance on the parent-child immunity
doctrine has been discussed by many courts. Until Goller v. White,2
almost all courts had held that the existence of liability insurance
was absolutely irrelevant in a tort action since the insurer is respon-
sible only as an indemnitor of the liability of the insured.27 The
Goller court said, however:
[W] e consider the wide prevalence of liability insurance in per-
sonal injury actions a proper element to be considered in making the
policy decision of whether to abrogate parental immunity in negli-
gence actions. This is because in a great majority of such actions,
where such immunity has been abolished, the existence of insurance
tends to negate any possible disruption of family harmony and disci-
pline.28
Justice Moise, in his dissenting opinion in Nahas v. Noble,2" noted
the trend away from the parent-child immunity rule. He accepted
the Balts80 reasoning 31 and noted that the many exceptions to the
rule showed that the courts have been "eroding it gradually rather
than . . . meeting it squarely and rejecting it."3' 2 Justice Moise also
found reasonable Goller's83 consideration of the prevalance of in-
25. Id.
26. 20 Wis. 2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963).
27. Rambo v. Rambo, 195 Ark. 832, 114 S.W.2d 468 (1938) ; Villaret v. Villaret,
83 App. D.C. 311, 169 F.2d 677 (1948) ; Lasecki v. Kabara, 235 Wis. 645, 294 N.W.
33, 130 A.L.R. 883 (1940) ; Hastings v. Hastings, 33 N.J. 247, 163 A.2d 147 (1960). At
least two courts have grounded recovery on the existence of insurance: Worrell v.
Worrell, 174 Va. 11, 4 S.E.2d 343 (1939) ; Lusk v. Lusk, 113 W. Va. 17, 166 S.E. 538
(1932). See also Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 A. 905, 71 A.L.R. 1055 (1930).
28. Goller v. White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193, 197 (1963).
29. 77 N.M. 139, 420 P.2d 127 (1966).
30. Baits v. Baits, 273 Minn. 419, 142 N.W.2d 66 (1966).
31. See text accompanying notes 26 and 27 supra.
32. Nahas v. Noble, 77 N.M. 139, 144, 420 P.2d 127, 130 (1966).
33. Goller v. White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963).
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surance coverage in making the policy decision to reject the rule."'
Justice Moise's view is preferable to the majority's because of
the steady expansion of insurance coverage. A disruption of do-
mestic harmony would not result from a parent-child tort action
where, as in the great majority of cases, the insurance company is
the true defendant. On the contrary, it is difficult to think of a more
disrupting factor to family harmony than the lack of insurance
coverage for an inter-family tort. This could result in a continual
drain on the family income.
When a father takes out a liability insurance policy, it would be
absurd to say that he meant it to compensate everyone in the world
except his own children. Is this not the result under the parent-child
immunity rule, however?
Of course, persons not covered by insurance would also be af-
fected by an abrogation of the parent-child immunity rule. But, is it
unreasonable to say that the natural love and affection between
members of a family would prevent tort actions except for serious
wrongs? Moreover, serious wrongs are already considered excep-
tions to the rule by most courts.
The Nahas majority's decision that only the legislature should
overturn the doctrine is highly questionable since it was laid down
as a rule of law by a court decision in the first place.
Dictum in the recent case of Fitzgerald v. Faldez35 indicates that
the New Mexico Supreme Court has reaffirmed its acceptance of
the parent-child immunity doctrine. It also illustrates another
inequitable result that arises from the doctrine-the denial of con-
tribution rightly due a third-party from a family member who is
jointly responsible for the injury. In Fitzgerald, a father was fatally
injured while standing between his son's car and his own attaching a
tow chain. The defendant struck the rear of the son's car, crushing
the father between the two cars. The father's executor brought a
wrongful death action against the defendant. The family immunity
issue arose in a third-party action brought by the defendant against
the son for contribution. The New Mexico Supreme Court reiter-
ated its position on the subject:
34. See text accompanying note 30 supra.
35. 77 N.M. 769, 427 P.2d 655 (1967). The court held that the parent-child im-
munity rule did not apply in this case, because the twenty-one year old son had become
emancipated upon reaching majority even though he was supported entirely by his
parents. Justice Noble dissented, disagreeing that the rule stripping a child of his im-
munity upon his twenty-first birthday should be absolute.
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The right of contribution is denied if the plaintiff, because of a
marital, filial or other family relationship between the injured per-
son and the person against whom contribution is sought, did not have
an enforceable right against the latter.86
The above rule is an offspring of the joint tortfeasor doctrine
which says that one tortfeasor cannot obtain contribution from
another tortfeasor if the latter has no obligation to the injured
party.87 The rule was first accepted by the New Mexico Supreme
Court in Rodgers v. Galindo.3 Pennsylvania, 9 however, along with
several other jurisdictions 40 has refused to extend the family im-
munity doctrine to deny third-party tortfeasors contribution. The
Pennsylvania court reasons that the application of the parent-child
immunity to the joint tortfeasor situation "would be an injustice,
since neither of the reasons for the [immunity] apply to such situa-
tions." 4'
The Nahas court had notice of the Rodgers decision. It was aware
that the parent-child immunity doctrine would bar recovery by per-
sons other than the family members. It escapes reason, therefore,
how the court could base its acceptance of the immunity on the
ground that it protects family harmony.
The parent-child immunity doctrine has outlived its era. Today,
the insurance company is usually the true defendant (and advocate
of the doctrine). Thus, in the great majority of cases there would be
no disruption in domestic harmony. The danger of fraud and col-
lusion is the same as in actions between husband and wife (allowed
in many states), near relatives, and close friends. The court system,
however, "with its attorneys and juries, is experienced and reason-
ably well fitted to ferret out the chicanary which might exist in such
36. Fitzgerald v. Valdez, 77 N.M. 769, 775, 427 P.2d 655, 659 (1967).
37. W. Prosser, supra note 1, § 47 at 277.
38. 68 N.M. 215, 360 P.2d 400 (1961).
39. Restifo v. McDonald, 426 Pa. 5, 230 A.2d 199 (1967) ; Puller v. Puller, 380 Pa.
219, 110 A.2d 175 (1955) ; Pasquinelli v. Reed, 174 Pa. Super. 566, 102 A.2d 219 (1954)
Fisher v. Diehl, 156 Pa. Super. 476, 40 A.2d 912 (1945).
40. LaChance v. Service Trucking Co., 215 F. Supp. 162 (D. Md. 1963) ; Bedell v.
Reagan, 159 Me. 292, 192 A.2d 24 (1963) ; Pelowski v. Frederickson, 263 Minn. 371,
116 N.W.2d 701 (1962) ; Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines v. Rosenthal, 14 N.J. 372, 102
A.2d 587 (1954) (injured person and second tortfeasor married after judgment had
been paid by first tortfeasor) ; Smith v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 247 La.
695, 174 So. 2d 122 (1965) ; Zarrella v. Miller, 217 A.2d 673 (R.I. 1966).
41. Fisher v. Diehl, 156 Pa. Super. 476, 40 A.2d 912, 918 (1945).
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cases. ' 42 The courts have never refused cases on the sole ground
of a possibility of collusion.
The only sound reason for the parent-child immunity doctrine
today is the preservation of parental discipline. If an action by a
child were allowed for every act of discipline or control by the
parent, the parent might lose control over the child, and the child
might come to disrespect the disciplining parent. The Wisconsin
Supreme Court, however, minimized this danger by retaining the
immunity for cases involving acts of parental authority and parental
discretion with respect to food and care.48
It is respectfully suggested that the New Mexico Supreme Court
reassess its position on the parent-child immunity doctrine and es-
pecially reconsider its application to the third-party tortfeasor
situation.
WALTER F. PEYTON, JR.
42. Briere v. Briere, 107 N.H. 432, 224 A.2d 588, 590 (1966).
43. Goller v. White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193, 198 (1963).
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